

Message Text

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SUBJECT: INDO-JAPANESE MEETINGS IN NEW DELHI

REF: A. NEW DELHI 15970

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1. SUMMARY - RECENT INDO-JAPANESE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW DELHI, BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL, INDICATE A CONTINUING JAPANESE DETERMINATION TO HOLD TO CURRENT LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AS A MARK OF DISAPPROVAL OF THE GOI'S NUCLEAR POLICY. CONVERSATIONS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH OFFICIALS FROM BOTH SIDES SUGGEST ALSO THAT "FRIENDLY AND FRANK" BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THESE ISSUES WILL CONTINUE AND THAT THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MAY PAY HIS LONG-DELAYED VISIT TO INDIA IN 1975. END SUMMARY.

2. INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
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FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE FROM JAPAN TURNED OUT

TO BE THE MAIN SUBJECT OF CONTENTION AT RECENT MEETINGS IN NEW DELHI OF DELEGATIONS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES (NEW DELHI 1970). THE INITIAL SET OF TALKS (NOVEMBER 21-22), DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS "UNOFFICIAL" OR "SEMI-OFFICIAL," BY JAPANESE EMBASSY AND MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SOURCES, WAS APPARENTLY MARKED BY A FIRM STATEMENT BY OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND PRESIDENT OKITA THAT THE JAPANESE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO INCREASE ASSISTANCE TO INDIA IN VIEW OF THE INDIAN POLICY ON PROLIFERATION. DR. OKITA DESCRIBED THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE IN RESPONSE TO AN INDIAN DELEGATION APPEAL FOR INCREASED JAPANESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THE "UNOFFICIAL" TALKS PRECEDED AND SET THE STAGE FOR TWO DAYS OF OFFICIAL TALKS (NOVEMBER 27-28) BETWEEN RESPECTIVE MFA DELEGATIONS HEADED BY SECRETARY TRIVEDI ON THE INDIAN SIDE AND DEPUTY MINISTER ARITA ON THE JAPANESE. BASED ON CONVERSATIONS (IN CONFIDENCE) WE HAVE HAD WITH A JAPANESE EMBASSY OFFICIAL (SUGINO) AND MEA EAST ASIA DEPUTY SECRETARY (BOUDHWAR), BOTH OF WHOM PARTICIPATED, THE OFFICIAL TALKS COVERED MUCH MORE GROUND THAN THE UNOFFICIAL BUT THE STANDOFF IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY NONETHELESS REMAINED.

3. PERHAPS ANTICIPATING TROUBLE, THE INDIAN SIDE AT THE INITIAL UNOFFICIAL MEETING SOUGHT TO CONFINE THE DISCUSSION TO AREAS OF POSSIBLE INDO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE JAPANESE SIDE LED BY DR. OKITA, HOWEVER, STATED DIRECTLY THAT INCREASED JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN THE INDIAN POSITION ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. WHILE GRANTING THE AVOWED PEACEFUL INTENT OF INDIA'S PROGRAM, THE JAPANESE SIDE CITED PRESSURES WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE DIET OPPOSED TO THE INDIAN POSITION, AND KEPT RETURNING TO THE ARGUMENT THAT A CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE A "PEACEFUL" EXPLOSION COULD READILY BE PUT TO PRODUCING AN EXPLOSION FOR A MILITARY PURPOSE. ACCORDING TO SUGINO, THE JAPANESE SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE MPT WAS NOT PERFECT BUT ARGUED THAT IT WOULD STILL RETARD NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE ULTIMATELY TO CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PROLIFERATION WAS UNLIKELY.

4. AT THE ENSUING OFFICIAL TALKS INDIAN MEA SECRETARY TRIVEDI (WHO HAS WORKED ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS FOR SOME YEARS) VIGOR-
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OUSLY DEFENDED INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY, ASKING THE JAPANESE TO CONSIDER NOT ONLY THE GOI'S DECLARATION OF PEACEFUL INTENT BUT ALSO ITS ACTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AREA, E. G., ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF THE ATOMIC WEAPONS AT HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI AND ITS ONLY BELATED DEVELOPMENT OF EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY, ACCORDING TO BOUDHWAR IN MEA, TRIVEDI TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT CHOU EN-LAI INFORMED THE INDIANS IN 1956 THAT THE GOI WAS "TEN YEARS AHEAD" OF CHINA IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. TRIVEDI CITED THE GOI'S FOR-

BEARANCE IN NOT HAVING AN EXPLOSION UNTIL WELL AFTER THE CHINESE ATTACK IN THE EARLY 1960'S AND THEN HERE EXPLOSION IN 1964 AS A FURTHER "ACTION" TESTIFYING TO THE GOI'S CAUTION. ACCORDING TO SUGINO, TRIVEDI - IN HIS LONG PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOI'S POSITION - ALSO CITED SECRETARY KISSINGER'S "SATISFACTION" WITH THE GOI'S NUCLEAR POLICY AS EVIDENCED BY THE INDO-US JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

5. AT THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMIC TALKS THE INDIAN SIDE REPORTEDLY PRESSED FOR INCREASED JAPANESE IMPORTS OF INDIAN MANUFACTURED AND SEMI-FINISHED PRODUCTS AND INVESTMENT IN STEEL PRODUCTION AND MINERAL EXTRAURION. THE JAPANESE WERE ALSO INVITED TO SONCIDER INVESTING IN PRODUCTION OF AUTO-MOTIVE PARTS FOR EXPORT TO JAPAN. ACCORDING TO SUGINO, AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE OFFICIAL (M.G. KAUL, WHO WAS IN TOKYO IN MAY) JOINED THE ECONOMIC TALKS AT POINT TO URGE JAPANESE FINANCING OF A STEEL-PROCESSING PLANT. THE JAPANESE, WHILE AGREEING TO STUDY FURTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION, RECITED-- AS THEY HAVE IN PREVIOUS SUCH ENCOUNTERS--GOI RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAMPERED JAPANESE INVESTMENT.

6. ACCORDING TO BOUDHWAR, THE INDIANS WERE NOT SURPRISED THAT THE JAPANES HAD MAINTAINED THEIR STAND AGAINST IN-CREASING ASSISTANCE TO INDIA. BOUDHWAR NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE TANAKA GOVERNMENT HAD RESIGANED DURING THE TALKS, AND SUGGESTED THE GOI WAS HOPING FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING POLICY UNDER A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAW THE JAPANES POLICY AS PART OF AN OVERALL TOKYO SLOW-DOWN ON DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT RICH IN RAW MATERIALS. IT WAS UNDERSTAJNDABLE, HE SAID, THAT JAPAN WAS NOW MORE INTERESTED IN INVESTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOME SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. SUGINO, IN HIS COMMENTS TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER DECEMBER 3, THOUGH THAT SOME COMPROMISE ON INCREASED AID TO

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INDIA MIGHT IN FACT BE REACHED IN TOKYO. PERHPAS THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, WHICH NOW STONGLY OPPOSED INCREASED AID, WOULD ULTIMATELY AGREE WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS MIGHT DETERIORATE FROM THEIR CURRENT /"CORDIAL" STATE WERE AID NOT INCREASED, AT LEAST SO AS TO COMPENSATE FOR INFLATION.

7. SOME ATTENTIONA AT THE OFFICIAL-LEVEL TALKS WAS DEVOTED TO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL QUESTION. ACCORDING TO SUGINO, MEA SECRETARY TRIVEDI RECOUNTED GOI EFFORTS TUO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND OFFERED A CONCLUSION THAT THE OBSTACLE TO IMPROVED RELATIONS WAS NOT SINO-INDIAN BORDER QUESTIONS BUT RATHER THE PRS'S "OBSESSION" WITH THE USSR AND, BUY EXTENSION, INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS. TRIVEDI WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, AND ALSO

STRESSED TO THE JAPANESE THE GOOD STATE OF INDO-IRANIAN RELATIONS. THE SHAH'S ECONOMIC COMMUNITY CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, AFTER COOPERATIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION; AND INDIA DOES NOT WISH TO BE PUSHED BY OUTSIDE POWERS IN HANDLING HER REMAINING SUBCONTINENTAL PROBLEMS (PAKISTAN). INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND INDIAN OCEAN QUESTIONS WERE ONLY TOUCHED ON IN PASSING.

8. A JOINT PRESS RELEASE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AS "MOST FRIENDLY AND FRANK" AND SAID THE MEETING HAD CONTRIBUTED TO A "BETTER UNDERSTANDING" OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES. IT WAS ANNOUNCED THE TENTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN TOKYO (PRESUMABLY NEXT YEAR). ALTHOUGH THE PRESS RELEASE MADE NO MENTION OF VISITS, BOTH SIDES APPARENTLY EXPECT THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO COME TO DELHI DURING 1975. SUGINO SAID SUCH A VISIT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR. BOUDHWAR INDICATED THAT THE GOI WAS "RECEPTIVE" TO A "HIGH-LEVEL VISIT" TO INDIA SINCE BOTH PRIME MINISTER GANDHI AND (FORMER) FOREIGN MINISTER SINGH HAVE BEEN IN TOKYO IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. COMMENT - WE HAD HEARD SEVERAL MONTHS AGO FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY THAT THE GOI HAD EARLIER DELAYED A VISIT BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER BECAUSE OF ITS DISPLEASURE AT TOKYO'S REACTION TO THE MAY 18 EXPLOSION.

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